Treasury withdrawal poll - voting pack

The poll will open on Friday June 6 at 12:00pm UTC and will close on Tuesday June 10 at 23:59 UTC.

Vote here!

1. Purpose of this pack

This brief is designed to give you a clear, side-by-side view of five possible ways to structure Treasury Withdrawals that will release funds, if approved, for our coordinated ₳275.3 million budget.

By the end, you should understand:

  • What each option offers

  • Pros, cons, and downstream consequences

  • How your choice impacts the governance workload, risk profile, and business continuity assurance for funded teams

Polling window and methodology

The polling window will open on Friday June 6 at 12:00pm UTC and will close on Tuesday June 10 at 23:59 UTC.

In this first year of governance, we recognise we are dealing with an immature and imperfect process. This is a critical year for ecosystem funding. Trade offs will be required to balance the perfect with the pragmatic, broad consent with compromise and keep the process moving forward. With increasingly varied and competing views on how to proceed following our Budget Info Action, the purpose of the poll is to help and inform Intersect how to present budget items (if approved) as Treasury Withdrawal governance actions - capturing a quantified data point from Dreps before we submit. As a DRep the question you are being asked:

How would you like to see Intersect submit Treasury Withdrawals against our Budget Info Action? Please select a single preferred option.

Please use this guide to help unpack the various options and pros and cons to each.

Challenges ahead & balancing act

Challenge
Why it matters

Role of the Treasury Withdrawal

Treasury withdrawals must be made pursuant to a previously approved budget. They provide greater granularity by defining the withdrawal schedule, the addresses where the funds go and actual amounts to be withdrawn against budget.

Intersect administrative bandwidth

Multiple withdrawals will place increased overhead internally around drafting, coordination and submission dates. In an ideal scenario, withdrawals are submitted on the same day (or same epoch) to support NCL considerations and unified delivery windows, however this can also present a volume of work for the ICC. For option E, due to the volume of governance actions, Intersect cannot support directly, and vendors will have to submit their own governance action.

Builder ecosystem expectations

Builders and vendors rely on timely, predictable funding to complete their initiative/s. Lack of clarity on funding runways throughout multiple governance actions can create uncertainty - whether it’s by stalling hiring, OPEX & CAPEX decisions, or more specific activities such as venue bookings could work against building reputational trust.

Governance load & voter fatigue

More granular voting increases discretion but risks lower turnout. Non-voting, active DReps count against yes votes, risking inability to achieve the 67% threshold to pass. Other governance actions may be live at the same time, adding to the voting load on DReps and the ICC. Intersect may re-submit and restructure lower turnout treasury withdrawals if deemed appropriate.

Net Change Limit (NCL) friction

The current NCL will conclude before many projects proposed within Intersect’s budget will complete (i.e contracts continue into 2026). Some of the options detailed further down are designed to work well within the current NCL of 350m ada by issuing treasury withdrawals based on 2025 and 2026 (noting that as an ecosystem we need to set a new 2026 NCL).

Risk management vs. speed

Robust oversight is essential, yet excessive processes can slow ecosystem momentum. For all cases, Intersect will apply rigorous oversight controls to ensure that any funds withdrawn are disbursed based on milestone acceptance and controls to stop payment for non-delivery.

Operational overhead

Governance actions each require a ₳100k deposit, hours of diligent drafting and technical resources to submit.

Intersect’s task here is challenging. Ultimately, it is to ‘thread the needle’. As a community, we need to align on an approach that is achievable with Intersect’s current operational capacity and honors & respects Cardano’s decentralized ethos. Builders need enough assurance to start work and commit to their full proposals. DReps need to know that their voice has been reasonably heard, and that there is an acceptable level of consent (even though not everyone will get what they would ideally want). All the while keeping governance workloads sustainable, and most importantly, delivering the next generation of features for Cardano.


2. Key constraints & context

Constraint
Why it matters

Approved budget

Treasury withdrawals must align the approved budget and is the mechanism that moves from intent to action.

Higher Approval Threshold

Every Treasury Withdrawal needs >67 % of active delegated DRep stake and CC approval to pass.

Net Change Limit (NCL)

Withdrawals must stay inside the live NCL. If over‑subscribed, withdrawals would fail until the NCL period resets or we have a new NCL in-effect.

Deposit Requirement

Each on‑chain action carries a deposit (₳100k). Intersect can only sponsor a limited number at a time; however, crowdsourcing options exist.

Delivery Window

In all cases, Intersect will manage disbursements based on milestones and contractual arrangements, with payments distributed throughout the project delivery lifecycle. This ensures that Treasury funds are only released as vendors meet predefined checkpoints, helping to protect against non-delivery and reduce financial risk.

Options A, B, and E request the full value for the entire project upfront (as per the Budget Info Action), but disbursements to vendors will still follow milestone-based contracts to ensure accountability and control.

For Options C and D, Treasury Withdrawals are split into two waves: the first wave funds 2025 deliverables only, while follow-up withdrawals for 2026+ would be prepared in H2 2025 after milestone reviews. This staged approach limits upfront Treasury exposure, aligns to the current Net Change Limit (NCL), and allows for delivery validation before further funds are released.

Oversight & Contracts


3. Decision framework

The snapshot below is an estimated level of effort or impact that could be considered when evaluating options. Where we have said low impact/effort, it doesn’t necessarily imply “better” or more optimal. When weighing each option, keep these dimensions in mind:

  • Granularity – How finely do you want to tune funding decisions?

  • Coordination effort – The operational load on Intersect, proposers, ICC, and overall ecosystem including fellow DReps.

  • Business assurance – How quickly projects know funds are secure so they can hire, sign contracts, or book venues.

  • Governance stability – Likelihood that administrative complexity, deposit costs, or voter fatigue delay or cause proposals to fail.

Comparative snapshot

Option
Est # Withdrawals
Granularity
Coordination Effort
Business Assurance
Governance Stability

A) Single withdrawal

For full proposal value: 1

Total: 1

Low

Low

Very High

Low (all or nothing)

B) Two Support brackets with one withdrawals each

For full proposal value: 2

Total: 2

Low

Low

High

Low

C) Two Support brackets with two withdrawals each

For 2025: 2

For 2026: 2

Total: 4

Low-Med

Low-Med

Med-High

Low

D) Five Support brackets

(50-59%, 60-69%...)

For 2025: 5

For 2026: 5

Total: 10

Medium

Medium

Medium

Medium

E) 39 Individual

For full proposal value: 39

Total: 39

High

High

Low

Med-High (per‑proposal)

“Low” or “High” doesn’t necessarily indicate an option is better or worse, but aims to simplify the differences between options and we recognize that these are subjective.


4. Detailed option breakdown

A. Single withdrawal (omnibus)

What it is: One governance action for the full budget; withdrawal sized for 2025 spend (₳165 – ₳179 M). The remaining amount to be requested again in a single action later in the year.

Withdrawals to fund all proposals in full: 1

Pros

  • Fastest path to execution; one vote, one transaction.

  • Builds on the existing consensus from Ekklesia, which DReps helped shape with 70%+ of active stake participating (minus predefined voting options). This option matches, like-for-like, what is included in the Budget Info Action.

  • Lowest operational cost for all parties.

Cons

  • No proposal‑level veto; DReps must accept or reject everything that has been approved in the budget info action.

  • Failure stalls funding, adds time, and causes rework.

Consequences if chosen

  • If approved, funds move as soon as the Treasury Withdrawal is enacted (one epoch following vote ratification); projects can start to receive funding days after withdrawal

  • If it fails, Intersect or proposers resubmit a new structure or single governance actions, adding a minimum 6‑8 weeks due to the on-chain parameters.

  • ICC review effort is lower by only needing to adjudicate on a single withdrawal action, however diligence is still needed to ensure constitutionality with all 39 proposals.

B. Two support brackets - proposals above 67% and between 50%+1 and 67%

What it is: Two Treasury Withdrawal governance actions. One groups all proposals that received greater than 67% support in the Ekklesia signal. The second, groups proposals that received between 50%+1 and 67%.

Withdrawals to fund all proposals in full: 2

Pros:

  • Directly aligned with on-chain governance thresholds: Reflects the >67% supermajority required to pass Treasury Withdrawals, creating a logical bridge from signaling to execution.

  • Enables faster execution for proposals already likely to pass without friction, while allowing further scrutiny of those with narrower support.

  • Simplifies decision-making compared to thematic or per-proposal models, while still offering more discretion than a single omnibus withdrawal.

  • Easier to coordinate than high-volume options, reducing operational burden for Intersect and the ICC.

Cons:

  • Blunt segmentation: Proposals with similar themes or delivery dependencies may be split between the two groups, which can introduce delivery uncertainty or administrative complexity.

  • Lower-support group may be at risk: Proposals in the 50%+1 to 67% bracket may struggle to pass if DRep turnout is low or if concerns emerge during voting.

  • Less nuance than bracketed or thematic groupings: Offers only two levels of granularity, which may not reflect the full spectrum of community sentiment.

Consequences if chosen

  • The >67% withdrawal can be submitted and likely ratified quickly, enabling timely disbursement for the most strongly supported proposals.

  • The 50%+1 to 67% withdrawal may take longer to pass or fail to meet the required threshold, potentially delaying funding for those initiatives.

  • If the second withdrawal fails, proposals within it would need to be resubmitted individually or regrouped, adding 6–8 weeks of delay.

  • This model provides moderate assurance to builders in the high-support group, but limited certainty for those in the lower bracket until voting concludes.

C. Two support brackets - proposals above 67% and between 50%+1 and 67% (in two sets of withdrawals)

What it is: Builds on Option B, but separates Treasury Withdrawals into 2025 and 2026 delivery windows to align with milestone reviews and reduce Treasury exposure. 2026 Treasury Withdrawal governance actions would be submitted later this year.

Withdrawals to fund all proposals in full in 2025: 2

Withdrawals to fund all proposals in full in 2026: 2

Pros:

  • Directly aligned with on-chain governance thresholds: Reflects the >67% supermajority required to pass Treasury Withdrawals, creating a logical bridge from signaling to execution.

  • Enables faster execution for proposals already likely to pass without friction, while allowing further scrutiny of those with narrower support.

  • Simplifies decision-making compared to thematic or per-proposal models, while still offering more discretion than a single omnibus withdrawal.

  • Easier to coordinate than high-volume options, reducing operational burden for Intersect and the ICC.

Cons:

  • Blunt segmentation: Proposals with similar themes or delivery dependencies may be split between the two groups, which can introduce delivery uncertainty or administrative complexity.

  • Lower-support group may be at risk: Proposals in the 50%+1 to 67% bracket may struggle to pass if DRep turnout is low or if concerns emerge during voting.

  • Less nuance than bracketed or thematic groupings: Offers only two levels of granularity, which may not reflect the full spectrum of community sentiment.

Consequences if chosen

  • The >67% withdrawal can be submitted and likely ratified quickly, enabling timely disbursement for the most strongly supported proposals.

  • The 50%+1 to 67% withdrawal may take longer to pass or fail to meet the required threshold, potentially delaying funding for those initiatives.

  • If the second withdrawal fails, proposals within it would need to be resubmitted individually or regrouped, adding 6–8 weeks of delay.

  • This model provides moderate assurance to builders in the high-support group, but limited certainty for those in the lower bracket until voting concludes.

D. Five brackets by Ekklesia support

What it is: Proposals sorted into five brackets by signal strength. 50-59%, 60-69%, 70-79%, 80-89%, 90-100%

5 withdrawals to fund 2025:

  • 1 withdrawal combining 4 proposals from 50-59%

  • 1 withdrawal combining 5 proposals from 60-69%

  • 1 withdrawal combining 9 proposals from 70-79%

  • 1 withdrawal combining 8 proposals from 80-89%

  • 1 withdrawal combining 13 proposals from 90-100%

5 withdrawals to fund 2026:

  • 1 withdrawal combining 4 proposals from 50-59%

  • 1 withdrawal combining 5 proposals from 60-69%

  • 1 withdrawal combining 9 proposals from 70-79%

  • 1 withdrawal combining 8 proposals from 80-89%

  • 1 withdrawal combining 13 proposals from 90-100%

Pros

  • Uses voter sentiment to drive the grouping from the previous off-chain process – democratic and transparent.

  • Keeps bundles condensed without expanding the action count to 39 (number of individual proposals).

  • Higher‑support brackets likely to clear 67 % quickly, reducing funding risk for most popular proposals.

Cons

  • Related proposals may sit in different brackets, fracturing thematic clarity.

  • Brackets near the 67 % threshold may either squeeze through or fail unpredictably.

Consequences if chosen

  • Treasury Withdrawal governance actions can be ratified as soon as corresponding thresholds have been met by DReps and the ICC. As a result this could mean unlocking funds for the most highly regarded proposals while debate continues on marginal brackets.

  • If the withdrawal containing Intersect’s operating budget fails it will create ambiguity around funding the administrator for the remaining withdrawals.

E. 39 Individual withdrawals (per‑proposal)

What it is: Either Intersect or each proposer submits their own Treasury Withdrawal (≈₳100k, totalling ≈₳3.9 M).

39 withdrawals to fund the full project, 1 proposal each.

Pros

  • Maximum voter control and accountability.

  • Natural fit for radically decentralized governance ethos.

Cons

  • Larger ecosystem workload: 39 separate ICC and DRep reviews/votes.

  • Voter fatigue likely; turnout may drop, threatening 67 % approval threshold on later items. Default ‘No’ or abstain more likely, even for some high rated projects.

  • Administrative burden of needing to coordinate and submit proposals within the same epoch to judge NCL and delivery window with greater accuracy and clarity.

  • Smaller, lesser known vendors may be penalized and be rejected due to lack of awareness despite being important or integral to supporting other development.

Consequences if chosen

  • From a capacity and clarity perspective, Intersect cannot support the submission of 39 Treasury Withdrawal governance actions. They will need to be submitted by the vendor directly.

  • Given the scale, may fragment approvals and add delay for some projects

  • Delivery windows may be conflated, depending on on-chain approval timeframe, and add complexity to our role as the Administrator.

  • Projects face planning paralysis, potentially losing staff or partnership opportunities.


5. Intersect’s recommendation

Intersect has two main considerations to balance: serving as a neutral and impartial coordinator for Cardano, and fulfilling its role effectively as Administrator with contractual and delivery oversight. While Option A is the simplest path operationally, it offers limited discretion and presents risk if it fails. In light of community feedback, we encourage DReps to give consideration to Options B or C.

We also need to recognize DRep, Vendor, and wider community feedback as we shape the options now under consideration. We need to be pragmatic and acknowledge that however the process may be improved in the future, we must focus on what we can do in 2025.

Both of these approaches reflect the off-chain signal already provided by the community and offer a balanced path forward. It allows the most broadly supported initiatives to proceed with confidence, while giving space for further consideration of proposals with narrower support. We believe Option B or C best meet the needs of a diverse ecosystem while balancing the following:

  • Democratic legitimacy: It directly reflects the outcome of the final temperature check in Ekklesia, preserving the bottom-up character of the process while recognizing varying levels of community support.

  • Governance pragmatism: These options avoid the risks of a single all-or-nothing withdrawal and provide enough structure to maintain forward momentum without overwhelming DReps or the ICC.

  • Builder assurance: Proposals in higher-support brackets are more likely to receive timely funding, allowing those projects to begin delivery against agreed milestones, while lower-support proposals receive additional scrutiny.

  • This approach also encourages open discourse around projects and teams in the lower approval brackets.

  • Operational feasibility: Up to five actions are manageable within Intersect’s current administrative capacity, while still giving DReps meaningful discretion.

This is not a rigid model for future cycles, but a practical path for 2025 that honors what the community has already signaled while reducing unnecessary risk or rework. Nevertheless, the purpose of the poll is to help and inform Intersect how to present budget items (if approved) as Treasury Withdrawal governance actions - capturing a quantified data point from Dreps before we submit.


6. How the chosen structure flows to execution

  1. Ekklesia preference poll closes – XXX

  2. Intersect drafts withdrawals in the structure that considers DRep preference based on this poll.

  3. On‑chain submission – withdrawals ideally posted in the same epoch to support the ICC and DReps with NCL and project delivery clarity.

  4. DRep voting period – like all governance actions, Treasury Withdrawals expire after six epochs, but unlike Info Actions, can be ratified earlier if thresholds are met by both DReps and the ICC.

  5. Treasury disbursement – funds potentially available to vendors within days of a Treasury Withdrawal Action being enacted via Intersect’s role as their Administrator.

  6. Milestone reporting live – first reports due 30 days after receipt of funds.


7. What to consider when ranking

  • Voter fatigue vs discretion: More withdrawals = finer control but could risk lower turnout and delays.

  • Assurance to builders: Delays or uncertainty increase project risk, may erode community confidence and discourage vendors from working on Cardano

  • Operational capacity: ICC and Intersect headcount is finite; overstretch causes bottlenecks and increases risk of confusion and impact.

Ask yourself: Which structure balances the ideals of decentralization with the practical need to ship and maintain momentum?


8. FAQs

Can Intersect combine options?

To keep things simple and support a clear outcome, we’re asking DReps to vote for their most preferred option. While we recognize that other options may also be acceptable, selecting one helps us get a more decisive signal from the community.

What happens if the NCL is lower than the requested amount?

The current NCL in effect is 350 million ada. All options presented to DReps fall well within this limit and leave sufficient headroom for additional proposals from outside Intersect, which is an important consideration in Cardano’s open and permissionless system.

Who pays deposits?

Intersect will cover deposits for up to five bundles or actions. Options requiring more actions need proposers to fund their own, but can seek support from ecosystem options for example crowdsourcing deposits.


9. Action: cast your preference

  1. Head over to Ekklesia to vote: https://bit.ly/withdrawal-poll

  2. Choose one option between Options A–E

  3. The polling window will open on Friday June 6 at 12:00pm UTC and will close on Tuesday June 10 at 23:59 UTC

Last updated

Was this helpful?